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Galbraith, John Kenneth (15 October 1908–29 April 2006), and 
John Kenneth Galbraith (15 October 1908–29 April 2006), 
economist and author, was born in Iona Station, Ontario, Canada, to 
Archibald Galbraith and Sarah Catherine Kendall. Galbraith, who 
advanced and reinterpreted institutionalist and Keynesian traditions 
in economics while promoting a liberal and progressive political 
agenda, was arguably the best-known and most influential economist 
and public intellectual of his generation. He published dozens of 
books, served in a number of high-level government positions, and, 
as a faculty member at Harvard University for more than a quarter 
of a century, advised every Democratic president from Franklin 
Roosevelt to Bill Clinton.
Galbraith’s political education began at the hands of his father, who 
was active in agrarian politics in Ontario. Galbraith’s formal 
education at the outset was rudimentary. It began at a one-room 
school on Willy’s Sideroad and continued for four years at Dutton 
High School, followed by a fifth year at St. Thomas High School (the 
additional year necessitated by inadequate elementary school 
preparation). He matriculated at Ontario Agricultural College in 
Guelph, where he pursued a B.Sc. in agricultural economics. His 
major was animal husbandry. In a Time interview he later described 
OAC as “not only the cheapest but probably the worst college in the 




wider horizons, he applied for and won a Giannini Fellowship in 
Agricultural Economics, and in 1931 journeyed westward and to the 
United States to pursue graduate study at the University of 
California at Berkeley. By all accounts (including those of the FBI) he 
now became a much stronger student, although he was aware that 
students and faculty in the regular economics department 
considered those in the department of agricultural economics as 
second class. His doctoral dissertation, which in retrospect Galbraith 
viewed as “without distinction,” examined county expenditures in 
California.
Completing his thesis in 1934, and based on his overall performance 
at Berkeley, he secured a lecturer position at Harvard University, 
then still a center of research in agricultural policy and economics, 
where he taught on and off in a junior (untenured) capacity until 
1939. While in Cambridge, Massachusetts, he met his future wife, 
Catherine Merriam Atwater. They married on 17 September 1937, 
the same year in which Galbraith became a U.S. citizen.
During the 1930s Galbraith’s intellectual interests continued to 
broaden beyond agriculture. With funding from a Social Science 
Research Council fellowship, he and his wife traveled to England 
shortly after their wedding. John Maynard Keynes had published The 
General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money a year earlier, 
and, aware of its revolutionary potential, Galbraith wished to get a 
better fix on it and hoped to learn at the feet of the master. Keynes’s 
heart problems prevented more direct interaction, but Galbraith 
spent time among Keynes’s inner circle in Cambridge, England, as 
well at the London School of Economics, absorbing the lively 
controversies in the then rapidly developing field of 
macroeconomics.
During the 1939–1940 academic year Galbraith served as an 
assistant professor at Princeton University before receiving an 
invitation to work in Washington, D.C. His extensive public service 
commenced at this point, and it would have an important influence 
on his subsequent thinking and scholarship. In 1940 he began work 
at the National Defense Advisory Commission under the direction of 
Leon Henderson. Between 1941 and 1943 he served as deputy 
director of the Office of Price Administration, a government agency 
charged with enforcing Roosevelt’s General Maximum Price 
Regulation, promulgated in April 1942. In 1943, after Republican 
gains in the midterm election (and after, Galbraith said, finding that 
his enemies outnumbered his friends—the eventual fate, he 
suggested, of any price fixer), he was forced out. Between 1943 and 
1948, with time off for other government service, he held a position 
as an editor at Fortune magazine. It was there, he said, that he 
learned to write.
In 1945 Galbraith served as a director of the Strategic Bombing 
Survey, which concluded that large-scale aerial bombardment of 
Germany had done little to disrupt its industrial enterprise. In fact 
the survey revealed that the German economy was far from fully 
mobilized in 1943, and indeed much less so than the United States 
or Great Britain, both of which, he suggested, benefited greatly from 
the use of the new tool of national income accounting. The effects of 
bombing Germany were often not what might have been anticipated. 
The disruption of civilian life resulting, for example, from the 
firebombing of Hamburg in 1943 actually helped increase military 
production. Overall German aircraft and other munitions production 
continued to rise between 1943 and 1944. The conclusions of the 
survey were strongly resisted by proponents of air power, but 
Galbraith successfully challenged proposed changes in the report, 
arguing that one couldn’t compromise with the truth and that it 
mattered for purposes of national security that the conclusions 
accurately reflect what the survey had found.
Under President Harry S. Truman, Galbraith served for six months in 
the State Department as director of the Office of Economic Security 
Policy, occupied with issues of postwar reconstruction in Japan and 
Europe. Distrusted by senior diplomats and excluded from important 
decision making, Galbraith’s experience at Foggy Bottom was not 
happy. Two decades later he wrote a bestselling satirical novel about 
the department (The Triumph, 1968), influenced by this experience 
as well as that during his later service as ambassador to India.
In the fall of 1948 Galbraith returned to Harvard, again as an 
untenured lecturer. The following year a contentious debate 
developed among the faculty, administrators, and governing boards 
over whether he should be given a permanent position. Opposition 
centered principally around the undisputed facts that Galbraith 
found merit in Keynesian ideas and that he had refused to 
compromise on the report of the Strategic Bombing Survey. 
Harvard’s president, James Bryant Conant, finally concluded that the 
dispute came down to a question of academic freedom (it did), as 
well as a test of the authority of the department and administrators 
to appoint faculty (it was). He told the Board of Overseers that it 
could approve Galbraith’s appointment or he (Conant) would resign. 
In 1949 Galbraith assumed a tenured professorship in economics, a 
position he held until his retirement in 1975.
Galbraith’s experience as a journalist, public official, and empirical 
economist gave him a rich preparation for a career as a faculty 
member and public intellectual. Eschewing the isolation of the ivory 
tower, his would be an economics from the bottom up and from the 
top down. Good scholarship, he believed, required knowledge of the 
formal and informal rules governing economic activity and an 
understanding of politics, as well as an interest in and facility with 
actual data. He was intimately familiar with arcane details of 
agricultural regulation as well as the statistics of German aircraft 
production in 1943 and 1944. But politics also mattered. He had 
from a very early stage interacted with political leaders, legislators, 
and business executives at the highest levels. His sometimes 
jaundiced views of their motives and capabilities were influenced by 
familiarity but never a sense of intimidation, a perspective facilitated 
by his six-foot eight-inch stature and confidence in his own 
judgment. The maxim “Modesty is a vastly overrated virtue” adorned 
a needlepoint in his house in Cambridge.
Much of Galbraith’s work involved the study of power—both political 
and economic. He was of course no stranger to academic politics, 
but his knowledge and experience extended considerably beyond. In 
the Office of Price Administration he dictated to captains of industry 
what their price increases could be. In the struggles over the 
wording of the Strategic Bombing Survey report, he sparred with 
high-level civilian and military leaders. And his essays for Fortune
during the 1940s gave him a taste for the influence he could have by 
reaching an audience of millions.
Galbraith served as an adviser to every Democratic president (and a 
number of aspirants) for the better part of seven decades. Alongside 
his friend and colleague Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., he helped found 
Americans for Democratic Action and worked as an adviser and 
speechwriter in both of the unsuccessful Adlai Stevenson
presidential bids. John F. Kennedy had been his student as an 
undergraduate at Harvard in the 1930s. Initially Galbraith had found 
him not serious, but his opinion began to change after Kennedy 
became a senator. Galbraith worked with him closely, often over 
lunch at a Boston restaurant, as he developed his economic views.
After the 1960 election Kennedy appointed Galbraith ambassador to 
India, a post he occupied during a two-year leave of absence from 
Harvard (he had turned down the chairmanship of the Council of 
Economic Advisers). By all accounts his service in the diplomatic 
corps was exemplary. He established a close working relationship 
with the Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru. Galbraith’s 
agricultural upbringing made him sympathetic to the challenges 
faced by a developing country. During his spare time he developed 
an interest in and appreciation for Indian art, later coauthoring a 
book on the subject. He also engaged in serious and effective 
diplomacy, sometimes largely on his own. In 1962, while Washington 
was preoccupied with the Cuban Missile Crisis, he took charge of 
providing U.S. support to India during the October border war with 
China.
After Kennedy’s assassination, Galbraith worked closely with 
President Lyndon B. Johnson, helping him formulate and draft 
speeches promoting the War on Poverty. Galbraith was approached 
by Johnson regarding the U.S. ambassadorship to the United Nations 
but demurred, suggesting the Supreme Court justice Arthur 
Goldberg instead. Galbraith eventually broke with Johnson over the 
Vietnam War and played an influential role in the 1968 campaign of 
the Minnesota senator Eugene McCarthy. Following the election of 
Richard Nixon (one of his former staffers at the Office of Price 
Administration), Galbraith’s direct political influence began to wane, 
although he remained close to Senator Edward “Ted” Kennedy and 
continued to address a wide public audience. He retired from 
Harvard in 1975, but during the remaining three decades of his life 
continued to write prodigiously. In 1977 he developed and narrated a 
thirteen-part BBC television series, The Age of Uncertainty, also 
published as a book. In 2000 Bill Clinton awarded him the 
Presidential Medal of Freedom, an honor he had also received from 
President Truman in 1946.
Throughout his career Galbraith distinguished between big business, 
which enjoyed economies of scale and administered its own prices, 
and a competitive sector, consisting of smaller firms such as the 
family farm on which he had grown up, which had no choice but to 
take prices as given. His experience during the war had persuaded 
him that because of this dualism, price controls could supplement 
appropriate fiscal and monetary policies in controlling inflation, even 
though they were often dismissed out of hand as both undesirable 
(because they interfered with the optimal allocation of resources) 
and ineffective. It might be impossible to control prices within the 
competitive or market sector. But it was relatively easy to do so in 
oligopolistic industries dominated by large firms that, left to their 
own devices, had and used pricing power. In other words, one could 
easily fix prices publicly that had traditionally been fixed privately.
Galbraith’s first book, A Theory of Price Control (1952), ran only 
seventy-five pages of text. In spite of this, he complained, “five 
people read it. Maybe ten. I made up my mind that I would never 
again place myself at the mercy of the technical economists who had 
the enormous power to ignore what I had written. I set out to involve 
a larger community.” This he did with a vengeance, publishing 
several blockbuster books in the 1950s and 1960s that remain 
classics.
In American Capitalism: The Concept of Countervailing Power
(1952), Galbraith argued that big labor (the unionized share of the 
U.S. labor force was then peaking; the American Federation of Labor 
and the Congress of Industrial Organization would merge in 1955) 
operated as a counterweight to big business. While both might tend 
to reduce efficiency through the exercise of market power, their 
respective bargaining powers served to keep the other in check. 
Similarly, in non-vertically integrated industries, market power 
among sellers gave rise (and he approved of this) to countervailing 
market power among buyers.
Galbraith’s disdain for antitrust policy, which set him apart from 
many other liberal thinkers, is evident in this as it was in his 
subsequent works. He granted that there could be losses to 
consumer welfare because of the exercise of pricing power, as 
predicted by standard analyses of monopoly or collusive oligopoly. 
But, he suggested, building on Schumpeterian ideas, this was more 
than compensated for by the strong incentives to organized research 
and development (R and D) under oligopoly. Oligopolistic price 
umbrellas ensured a high and steady flow of retained earnings that 
helped finance R and D; the small number of firms meant that an 
innovator could hope to capture a large portion of the benefits of 
innovation. “The foreign visitor, brought to the United States to 
study American production methods and associated marvels, visits 
the same firms as do attorneys of the Department of Justice in their 
search for monopoly,” he remarked sardonically in American 
Capitalism (p. 87).
In contrast, firms in the competitive (“market”) sector had few 
resources for research. Except in the limiting case of effective patent 
protection, they could not expect to reap gains from R and D 
investments and thus had few incentives to make them. Far better, 
he suggested, for government to deal with market power by 
encouraging organization by the unorganized to provide 
counterbalance. This he saw as a central thrust of New Deal policies, 
particularly those affecting labor and farmers.
The Great Crash, 1929 (1955) provided a colorful history of the 
events leading up to the stock market crash and remains a superior 
introduction to the asset bubbles and growing financial fragility that 
developed in the 1920s and helped set the stage for the subsequent 
Great Depression. Galbraith insisted, in spite of what he saw as Wall 
Street’s attempt to pin the prolonged downturn on other causes, that 
the crash deserved a central place in accounts of depth and 
duration. The descriptions of financial “innovation,” rising leverage, 
and greater risk taking, although different in their particulars, bear 
many parallels with what happened prior to the crisis of 2008. The 
Great Crash, along with A Short History of Financial Euphoria
(1990), remains well worth reading, particularly in light of the Great 
Recession.
His best-known book, The Affluent Society (1958), developed themes 
adumbrated in American Capitalism. He described an economy 
whose highest priority was the mass production of consumer and 
military goods by the private sector. Wants, which orthodox theory 
takes as given, Galbraith saw as canalized and augmented by a 
richly resourced advertising industry and expanded provisions for 
consumer credit that helped big business manage and control the 
volume of its sales. A consequence was a high overall consumption 
share and falling household saving rates.
He depicted a federal government preoccupied with military 
spending and a nonmilitary public sector that was withering on the 
vine. This was reflected in a deteriorating environment, poor 
schools, starved public services, and inadequate support for the arts. 
His descriptions of political and economic debates in which 
Republicans demanded lower taxes, cuts in (nonmilitary) 
government spending, and balanced budgets as the remedy for 
recession—and rejected those opposed to these views as socialist or 
worse—are a reminder of how little has changed in U.S. political 
discourse in half a century.
The New Industrial State (1967) explored further the theme of a 
dualistic economy, with an emphasis on a dominant sector composed 
of large oligopolistic businesses operating as islands of planned 
economy within a putatively competitive free enterprise system. The 
book has received mixed treatment at the hands of history. Some of 
the companies featured, such as General Motors, which then sold 
one out of every two automobiles in the United States, subsequently 
fell on harder times, and, indeed, GM had to be rescued from 
bankruptcy by the federal government in 2009. Kodak, which milked 
its silver halide franchise for more than a century, was forced to seek 
bankruptcy protection in 2012.
However, GM subsequently revived, and new behemoths arose to 
take the place of those that did not, such early twenty-first century 
examples being Apple, Microsoft, and Google. All three, although 
they may have started in the equivalent of a proverbial garage, were 
large organizations with considerable pricing power, with extensive 
R and D operations and many technical specialists, and they 
struggled mightily and often successfully to control their 
environment. Apple and Microsoft in particular spent heavily on 
advertising. Nevertheless, vertical integration, a feature of dominant 
companies emphasized in The New Industrial State, was not a 
common a feature of these titans, nor did they seem to have the 
same close links to military procurement.
In The New Industrial State, Galbraith emphasized the importance of 
a technostructure, a theme that extended the Berle and Means 
analysis of managerial capitalism. Management and key employees 
eschewed profit maximization (and thus the economic interest of 
shareholders) in pursuit of growth and stability. This has also 
suffered somewhat at the hands of history. Perhaps in response to 
the phenomenon Galbraith had identified, management theorists and 
financial entrepreneurs pressed for the greater use of stock options 
to align the interests of management with those of shareholders, and 
the threat of hostile takeovers financed by junk bonds created an 
environment where share price became the dominant metric of firm 
success. It is true that managerial capitalism survived in the sense 
that most corporate boards remained firmly in the hands of the CEO, 
but the net effect of all these changes was an explosion of executive 
compensation. It was sometimes questionable how much 
shareholders (aside from top management) benefited from this. 
Nevertheless, there is little doubt that the 1967 landscape of 
industrial organization looked much different from that in the 
twenty-first century.
It was still true, however, that a relatively small number of 
companies controlled a disproportionate share of corporate assets 
and employed a disproportionate share of the labor force. So 
although the price-making sector may have changed in significant 
ways, it was not obvious that it had shrunk in favor of the 
competitive or monopolistically competitive sector of small farmers, 
gas station operators, and dry cleaners. In any event, Galbraith 
made it clear he did not think the large private corporation circa 
1967 represented the end of history. His attempt was to provide a 
conceptual framework for understanding its internal operations as 
well as its relationships with governments, shareholders, consumers, 
and sources of finance.
He bemoaned the reality that the corporation had been poorly 
integrated into economic theory and was not then subject to more 
systematic inquiry. In his concluding chapter of The New Industrial 
State he pointed out that, unlike the hard sciences, economics has to 
deal with changes both in its target of inquiry and in its tools for 
understanding them. The analytical tools of physics and chemistry 
do change (and improve) over time, but their subject matter does 
not, whereas economics must adjust to both types of change. So it is 
not entirely fair to criticize Galbraith for not having fully anticipated 
the course of industrial development over a half century. The books 
Galbraith wrote offer insights that transcend the times whose 
essential features they distilled. They are also particularly valuable 
in helping understand how the U.S. economy operated from the 
1920s through the 1960s, becoming increasingly useful to economic 
historians for that reason.
The first part of the 1970s was a transitional period in American 
politics and economics. These years witnessed the breakdown of the 
Bretton Woods system and the temporary return of a bastardized 
system of price controls to try to rein in inflation. Political 
assassinations, race riots, student protests that would help end the 
war in Vietnam, and the birth of a new feminist movement inspired 
an increasing sympathy for radical ideas among young economists. 
Yet Richard Nixon was in power, and the once-solid Democratic 
South had begun to crumble, as Johnson anticipated it would when 
he signed the 1964 Civil Rights Act. In the concluding section of his 
1973 book, Economics and the Public Purpose, Galbraith advocated 
progressive remedies that many would view as radical (his 
opponents on the right had never been hesitant to stigmatize him as 
such).
Extending the political analysis of The New Industrial State, he now 
advocated further moves in the direction of democratic socialism. He 
argued that social welfare would be improved by extending the 
economic planning—which he saw as a defining feature of big 
business and, for that matter, the Soviet Union—to much of the rest 
of the economy. The duality between a “planning system” and a 
“market system,” a feature of his writing in the 1950s and 1960s, 
again figures prominently, although this book, more Veblenesque in 
its tone than those published earlier, devoted more attention to the 
characteristics of the market sector. Nevertheless, there continues 
to be much emphasis on a business-scientific-government 
technostructure, “a complex of scientists, engineers and technicians; 
of sales, advertising and marketing men; of public relations experts, 
lobbyists, lawyers and men with a specialized knowledge of the 
Washington bureaucracy and its manipulation; and of coordinators, 
managers and executives” (Economics and the Public Purpose, p. 
78).
This book drew out implications of themes from his earlier work. 
Whereas most economists worried that monopolies or oligopolies 
restricted output compared to what would be true were the sectors 
organized competitively, Galbraith saw firms in the planning sector 
extracting disproportionate quantities of resources and churning out 
vast quantities of civilian and military goods that—in the absence of 
corporate control over advertising and the governmental process—
citizens, consumers, and shareholders would not necessarily desire. 
He also saw this structure as imparting systematic inflationary 
pressure to the economy, a prediction that held true through the 
remainder of the decade, although not following the tight money-
produced 1982 recession that ushered in three decades of relatively 
moderate price increases. It may not have been accidental, given 
Galbraith’s emphasis on the potential contribution of wage-price 
cycles in the planned sector to inflation, that this was also a period 
in which the American manufacturing sector and the unionized share 
of the labor force, outside of the public sector, shrank dramatically.
Galbraith advocated a government takeover of large defense firms 
(returning in a sense to the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century 
tradition of government-operated armories and arsenals), as well as 
the socialization of the medical system and mass transit. He held up 
government-funded research in the agricultural sector, part of the 
competitive sector of small firms (where privately funded R and D 
was rare), as a model that could be emulated elsewhere in the 
market sector (such as in home construction).
Finally, the 1973 book evidences a greater emphasis on economic 
inequality, advocating freezes on the incomes of the wealthy, controls 
on executive compensation, and devoting productivity gains to 
increasing the incomes of the poorest members of society. This was 
to be accomplished by strengthening rather than weakening the 
progressive income tax, raising minimum wages, and encouraging 
unionization in the market sector. Galbraith was writing at the end of 
a quarter century of postwar growth marked by a relatively 
egalitarian (as compared with the interwar period) distribution of 
income and wealth. When one reads in this book about the reduction
of top income tax rates to 50 percent, or how executives earned fifty 
times what the production worker earned, one is struck by how 
effectively ideas such as Galbraith’s have been countered by a 
conservative political agenda. In the 2000s corporative executives 
typically earned five hundred times the earnings of a production 
worker, and the top marginal tax rate was 35 percent.
Economics and the Public Purpose contains a more explicit 
articulation of progressive politics than in some of his earlier works. 
Distinctively, there is a continuing lack of interest in antitrust policy, 
which he viewed as a waste of time. He suggested in particular that 
small firms be totally exempt from the antitrust laws.
Galbraith’s longer-term influence on the discipline of economics has 
been uneven. Elected president of the American Economics 
Association in 1971, he put together an eclectic program that mixed 
the unorthodox with the orthodox. But, envied and resented by many 
of his colleagues for his felicity with words, the large audiences he 
commanded, and his access to and influence on top policy makers, 
he never received the Nobel Prize. Nevertheless his work kept alive 
and developed institutionalist and Keynesian approaches to the 
economy. These approaches, though often denigrated, ignored, or 
dismissed, continued to have great relevance, a relevance made all 
the more apparent by the economic history of the early twenty-first 
century.
The basic ideas surrounding institutionalism are not hard to grasp. If 
one is studying an economy it helps to know something about the 
legal and other rules that govern its operation and industrial 
organization. It’s also important to have a feel for underlying 
empirics. Galbraith was not an econometrician, but he insisted that 
the study of the economy starts with data and documents and does 
not fall prey to the vice of struggling to find ways to demonstrate or 
ensure that what “works” in theory actually “works” in reality. 
Influenced by Thorstein Veblen, and often as iconoclastic, as adept 
as Galbraith was at coining phrases, he nevertheless remained in 
somewhat closer discourse with orthodoxy than had his well-known 
institutionalist predecessor.
Galbraith also considered himself a Keynesian and tirelessly 
promoted the central insight of The General Theory, that it was 
possible for a decentralized market economy to stabilize at a level of 
employment and output below capacity, with a difference between 
actual and potential output representing an output gap associated 
with high unemployment. Given the institutional structure, 
particularly of long-term financial contracts, wage and price 
reductions would not necessarily resolve the problem. Escaping from 
a depression could require increases in government spending 
(ideally on well-chosen infrastructure) and tax reductions—Galbraith 
much preferred the former—to compensate for the decline in 
spending on plant and equipment and consumer durables. This 
might produce deficits in the short run, but the demand for a 
balanced budget during such times was, though intuitively 
appealing, counterproductive.
He also accepted and promoted the Keynesian insight that there 
were limits to how much one could rely on monetary policy to 
counteract a collapse of private spending in a serious recession. But 
the nature of fiscal expansion made a big difference for Galbraith. 
Ideally, he argued, stimulus should be in the form of spending on 
well-chosen infrastructure or investments in health, education, the 
arts, or government-funded R and D. He expressed considerable 
concern about the military garb within which Keynes appeared to 
triumph in the postwar period. High and continuing military 
expenditures in the 1950s and 1960s served to stabilize aggregate 
demand but also distorted the economy in ways that gave Galbraith 
pause. Nor was he enthusiastic about tax cuts, which he believed 
undermined the ability of the government to fund the public 
infrastructure and investments he so desired. He recognized, 
however, the likelihood that a strong fiscal capability might, given 
political realities, simply be used to fund an expanded military.
However, because he identified most private sector R and D as being 
performed by big business (firms able to exploit economies of scale 
and enjoying some pricing power), he saw military R and D, along 
with federal support for agricultural research, as helping to provide 
a more balanced flow of innovation across the industries and sectors 
of the economy.
Galbraith disagreed with conservative economists such as Milton 
Friedman on many points (Friedman, in fact, demanded and 
eventually received his own television series to respond to 
Galbraith’s). But they were closer than many realize in viewing 
inflation as a serious threat to an economy. Galbraith had a special 
aversion to strong rates of price rise because he saw this as 
dissolving the equilibrium associated with the balance of 
countervailing power between buyers and sellers, particularly of 
labor. When aggregate demand was weak, unions and management 
bargained over the division of profits. When demand was strong, 
their conflict was attenuated: Higher prices could simply be passed 
on to customers. It was out of a desire to short-circuit such 
dynamics, as well as his experiences in World War II, that he had 
such a fondness for wage and price controls.
Although Friedman and Galbraith shared an aversion to inflation, 
they differed sharply on what caused it and how best to forestall or 
control it. Galbraith strongly opposed conventional monetary policy 
remedies (raising interest rates) because the impact of adjustment 
fell differentially on the competitive portion of the economy, as 
opposed to that represented by large corporations, which, able to 
rely on retained earnings, were less dependent on capital markets 
for operating and expansion capital. At the same time he viewed 
fiscal restraint—raising of taxes and cutting of expenditure—as a 
more effective and desirable anti-inflation strategy. He saw this as a 
simple extension of Keynes’s insights, arguing for symmetry between 
Keynes’s respective remedies for inflation and depression. In 
contrast most interpreters see little about inflation in The General 
Theory, viewing it almost entirely as about depression. In opposition 
to Friedman, Galbraith viewed changes in the money supply as, to a 
considerable degree, consequence rather than cause of price rises 
and indeed questioned whether inflation could still be generated 
through the “old-fashioned” means of engineering an increase in the 
nominal money supply.
Economics and the Public Purpose, the third of the trilogy he began 
with The Affluent Society and The New Industrial State (with an 
assist from American Capitalism), was by a number of measures the 
least successful. Previous volumes had introduced such phrases to 
common discourse as “countervailing power,” “conventional 
wisdom,” and “technostructure”; the motif of convenient social 
virtue, which infused the 1973 volume, never quite caught on. But 
the book represented the fullest articulation of a central theme that 
pervaded his writing. Throughout his work and life, he stressed that 
economics and economic policy making could not be divorced from 
considerations of power and that to pretend otherwise was at best 
naive and at worst dishonest.
Galbraith died on 29 April 2006 in Cambridge, Massachusetts, at the 
age of ninety-seven. He was survived by his wife, three children, and 
ten grandchildren. His son James was a prominent economist at the 
University of Texas at Austin; Peter was a former ambassador to 
Croatia; and J. Alan was an attorney in Washington. A fourth son, 
Douglas, died of childhood leukemia in 1950.
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